Sunday, February 8, 2015

Michael Korman — How to Start a Proxy War with Russia

Arming the Ukrainian government would be a bad idea, no matter what the next defense secretary says.… 
The release of a report this week calling for a vast expansion of U.S. military aid to Ukraine, titled “Preserving Ukraine’s Independence, Resisting Russian Aggression,” helped reignite the debate in Washington, D.C. on the provision of lethal weapons and a reassessment of the U.S. role in the conflict.… 
Creating a sustainable professional force in Ukraine is a long-term effort the West must undertake as part of an overall strategy for the country, and perhaps under the framework of a strategic partnership that should emerge from thought and deliberation. Sending weapons in and of itself is not a strategy, either for Ukraine, or for settling the conflict.… 
This document advocates in no subtle terms for the United States to undertake a proxy war with Russia in Ukraine, and to supply the country with weapons equivalent to half of its current defense budget.… 
The recommendations for providing Ukraine with specific military capabilities are also unlikely to prove effective. Experts familiar with the reasons for Ukraine’s military defeat understand that it is not due to technical deficits, although those exist across the board in its armed forces, but because its army as a whole is not a capable force. It lacks logistics, training, commanders with experience at maneuvering brigade- or battalion-sized elements, any coordination between volunteer battalions and regular forces, along with independent military analysis of the problems. There is no intelligence, no mobile reserves, no unified command and a political leadership that often seems disconnected from the facts on the ground. Dumping weapons into this operating environment is unlikely to prove a solution to the problems, all of which are fundamental and structural. The only thing clear in this conflict is that Ukraine stands no chance of defeating Russian forces, or the separatists, and that military escalation is a disproportionately losing proposition for Kyiv.… 
The report makes little mention of the fact that light counter-battery radars had already been sent by the United States last fall, that Russia had matched these with its own, completely nullifying any advantage they might offer… The administration was right in arguing that any weapon we provide will be matched by Russia, escalating the conflict with no advantage gained for Ukraine.… 
Finally, UAVs, some of which have already been provided by Germany, will not prove effective, either. The authors of the report recommend the provision of medium-altitude UAVs, after stating that Russian armed forces are operating advanced air defenses throughout eastern Ukraine. In truth, there is video evidence of Russian air defenses including the TorM2, the Pantsir-S1 and the now-infamous BUK that shot down MH17. Medium-altitude drones cannot fly in this kind of air-defense environment. Stating that Russia has air superiority contradicts the recommendation to send such drones, which require the operator to have air superiority. 
Again, the point of these criticisms is not that doing nothing to help Ukraine is better than doing something, although the specific recommendations are unlikely to achieve their intended effects. It is that the thrust of these policies is to drag the United States into a proxy conflict with Russia, in an attempt to raise costs for Vladimir Putin, which will be fought out by Ukrainian soldiers and paid for most likely with Ukrainian lives. In reality, nothing short of a difficult political compromise is possible to end this conflict. Kyiv will indeed have to make sacrifices as a result of Russian aggression, it has lost territory, and Moscow is clearly willing to stake everything in this conflict. More than likely the key battles in this war have already been fought, or are being fought right now, and they have proved to be defeats for Ukraine. Javelin anti-tank launchers will not prove to be a silver bullet, but rather an additional escalation, especially when Russia’s military calculates it could destroy Ukraine’s armed forces in a matter of days at will.… 
Russian leaders will not withdraw their forces, or restore control of the border, until they first see that Kyiv is willing to give political status and recognition to the separatists.
Ukrainian leaders naturally have no desire to grant true political recognition or autonomy to the separatists, and Russia has no interest in abandoning them to be completely crushed by political, economic and military pressure from Ukraine. Hence, Moscow and Kyiv did not fulfill their respective obligations under this agreement, or withdraw troops according to the secret protocol signed on September 19. That protocol stipulated a line of control that neither side honored. The separatists desire more territory to make their enclaves viable, while Ukraine’s leaders didn’t want to deal with the domestic political calamity that would result from admitting defeat or giving up territory for peace.… In Kyiv, the leadership is divided, mindful of public sentiment and afraid that if they cut a deal with Moscow, a third Maidan could ensue.…

The reason for the resumption of the current war is that Russia’s leadership has wagered a colossal amount of political capital on its invasion of Ukraine. It is perhaps a matter of life and death for the current political system, and a core interest of Russia that it is unlikely to give up on, no matter the amount of Western political pressure or weapons sent. This is especially so given the casualties will be almost entirely Ukrainian on both sides.…
 
After Minsk, the West keenly levied economic and diplomatic pressure for Russia to implement provisions of the ceasefire agreement, while Kyiv had to do essentially nothing except hold the existing line of control. This presented Moscow with either policy capitulation, or continued suffering under the sanctions regime. Either way, the West had time to wait, and Russia did not. For the West, politically it was brilliant, diplomatically it was brilliant, but militarily it was dangerous. Russia has undertaken its only viable option, to launch another offensive, defeat Ukraine and erase the Minsk agreement by forcing Kyiv to sign a new one.…
The National Interest
How to Start a Proxy War with Russia
Michael Korman | Public Policy Scholar at the Kennan Institute, Wilson Center in Washington, D.C.

1 comment:

Ryan Harris said...

Since we know Russians are good adversaries that follow the rules, the risks are minimal while the defense expenditures are maximized. It's a no brainer for Dems, they look strong on defense without having to actually send troops into battle and hurt the sensibilities of their base. Their affluent will love a new proxy war for the benefits to finance, media, tech, and mfr. while the academics will support the Dems no matter what they do. The real benefit comes from rural districts and military communities that tilt right but will overwhelmingly support Dems if they can deliver better funding without actual fighting. This proxy war will probably get bipartisan support. If there was only a way that we could frame Kiev as not being pro-European but rather pro-US, it would make the politics easier. A few arms shipments opposed by the French might re-frame the whole debate to benefit the two-party system.